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Hollywood on the Bayou: An Optimal Tax Approach 
to Evaluating and Reforming the Louisiana Motion 
Picture Investor Tax Credit 
INTRODUCTION 
As Louisiana experiences record-setting growth in the film 
industry, awareness of the Louisiana Motion Picture Investor Tax 
Credit (MPITC)1 is more widespread than ever.2 In 1992, Louisiana 
was the first state to roll out a major film subsidy program.3 Then in 
2002, the Louisiana Legislature set out to “encourage development 
in Louisiana of a strong capital and infrastructure base for motion 
picture production in order to achieve an independent, self-
supporting industry.”4 Since the advent of the Louisiana MPITC, 
Louisiana has steadily gained recognition as a new hub for the film 
and television industry.5 In 2011, a record 150 productions applied 
for the film tax credits.6 For the productions that qualify, the 
incentives are significant: a 30% tax credit for spending at least 
$300,000 on productions filmed in Louisiana.7 
The MPITC has benefited the State of Louisiana considerably. 
Between 2008 and 2010, the annual volume of films produced in 
Louisiana increased by 175%.8 In 2010, the Louisiana film industry 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by AMELIA HURT. 
 1. For the duration of this Comment, the Louisiana Motion Picture Investor 
Tax Credit will be referred to as MPITC. 
 2. The recent record-setting growth in Louisiana film production was largely 
expected in part because of the increase in highly publicized films since the 
Legislature’s enactment of filmmaking tax incentives. See Mike Scott, Louisiana 
Film Industry Passes Billion-Dollar Mark in Record-Setting 2011, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE (Jan. 7, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.nola.com/movies/index.ssf 
/2012/01/louisiana _film_industry_passes.html (noting that the Louisiana film 
industry’s growth should come as no “surprise to anybody who’s been paying 
attention over the past decade” because of the consistent increase in major studio 
films shot in Louisiana). 
 3. TIM MATHIS, LOUISIANA FILM TAX CREDITS: COSTLY GIVEAWAY TO 
HOLLYWOOD, LOUISIANA BUDGET PROJECT (Aug. 2012), http://www.labudget.org 
/lbp/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/LBP-Report.Louisiana-Film-Tax-Credits.pdf. 
 4. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009) (amended 2013). 
 5. Richard A. Webster, Year in Review: Hollywood South Sets New Records, 
NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS. (Dec. 30, 2011, 2:51 PM), http://neworleans 
citybusiness.com/blog/2011/12/30/year-in-review-hollywood-south-sets-new-
records. 
 6. Id. 
 7. § 47:6007(C)(1)(c)(i). 
 8. CHERYL LOUISE BAXTER, FISCAL & ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF 
LOUISIANA’S ENTERTAINMENT INCENTIVES (2011), available at http://louisiana 
entertainment.gov/docs/main/louisiana_entertainment_2011_economic_impact_an
alysis.pdf. 
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became a billion-dollar player in the nationwide film market.9 
Louisiana is now ranked third in the country in film production 
activity, and the industry supports thousands of jobs in Louisiana 
that previously did not exist.10 Additionally, motion picture 
production companies and their employees spend money that would 
not otherwise benefit Louisiana residents and businesses.11 
Louisianans also enjoy the notoriety and excitement of living in 
“Hollywood South.”12 Some of the most highly publicized films 
released in 2012 took advantage of the MPITC. The popular 
Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn, Parts I and II directly contributed 
$189.3 million in economic activity in Louisiana while earning 
$33.2 million in tax credits.13 This translates to approximately $5.70 
in direct economic activity generated for every $1 of state tax credits 
awarded.14 Meanwhile, Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter resulted 
in $61.5 million in contributed economic activity and earned $19.3 
million in tax credits,15 which translates to approximately $3.19 in 
direct economic activity for every $1 in state tax credits awarded to 
the production.16 
Unfortunately, these results do not tell the whole story. An 
economic analysis by BaxStarr Consulting Group showed that 
motion picture production generated $27 million in state tax revenue 
in 2010 while the State certified $196.8 million in tax credits.17 This 
figure indicates that the State is paying roughly $7.29 per every $1 it 
collects as a result of the MPITC.18 The State of Louisiana is losing 
                                                                                                             
 9. Scott, supra note 2. 
 10. Adriana Lopez, A New Economic Report Surfaces, but It Could Have a 
Hollywood South Ending, FORBES (Aug. 10, 2012, 12:58 PM), http://www.forbes 
.com/sites/adrianalopez/2012/08/10/a-new-economic-report-surfaces-but-it-could-
have-a-hollywood-south-ending. 
 11. John Grand, Motion Picture Tax Incentives: There’s No Business Like 
Show Business, 39 STATE TAX NOTES 10 (2006), available at http://taxprof 
.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/2006-2997-1.pdf. 
 12. Matthew J. Bailey, Hollywood South: Why Film Credits Are Good for 
Louisiana, 48 STATE TAX NOTES 715 (2008), available at http://thelouisiana 
wavestudio.com/pdfs/Tax_Analyst_LA_Film_Credits.pdf. 
 13. Michelle Millhollon, Panel to Review Tax Incentives, THE ADVOCATE 
(July 1, 2012) (on file with the Louisiana Law Review). These economic 
contributions include payroll, purchases, and other economic activity in Louisiana. 
 14. $189.3 million/$33.2 million = $5.70 generated for every $1 of state 
investment. 
 15. Millhollon, supra note 13. 
 16. $61.5 million/$19.3 million = $3.19 generated for every $1 state 
investment. 
 17. BAXTER, supra note 8. 
 18. $196.8 million/$27 million = $7.29. See also Daryl G. Pupera, Louisiana 
Department of Economic Development and Louisiana Department of Revenue 
Motion Picture Investor Tax Credit Program, Performance Audit, LA. LEGIS. 
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money on the MPITC program at an alarmingly high rate, and the 
rapidly increasing number of applications from production 
companies wishing to utilize the program signifies even greater 
losses in the future.19 Some claim the MPITC creates a so-called 
“corporate welfare,” subsidizing wealthy movie producers at the 
cost of Louisiana taxpayers.20 In the 2013 Louisiana Legislative 
Session alone, two amendments to the MPITC were proposed and 
one enacted.21Amid a hefty budget deficit, Louisiana is making huge 
cuts to higher education and healthcare, while certifying $231 
million in funds to subsidize the Louisiana film industry in 2012 
alone.22 Thus, Louisiana’s film subsides are adding to an already 
devastating budget shortfall.  
The MPITC as a tax policy has gathered widespread support for 
the creation of industry and jobs but is simultaneously receiving 
heavy criticism for the high cost imposed on Louisiana taxpayers.23 
To properly analyze any tax policy, analytical models separate 
efficiency and equity concerns to gain the clearest view of the tax 
policy’s effectiveness.24 The “optimal taxation” approach, one such 
way to analyze a tax policy, seeks to find a tax configuration that 
minimizes the loss in economic efficiency due to taxation while still 
reflecting society’s attitude toward equity.25 Using the optimal tax 
                                                                                                             
 
AUDITOR (Apr. 24, 2013), http://app1.lla.la.gov/PublicReports.nsf/5A685258 
D794067E86257B57005B8D58/$FILE/00032357.pdf (“The result is a net [fiscal] 
cost to the state of $169.8 million for the calendar year 2010.”). 
 19. -86.28% Return on Investment (“R.O.I.”) where R.O.I. = (Gain from 
Investment – Cost of Investment)/Cost of Investment. 
 20. MATHIS, supra note 3. 
 21. H.B. 161, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013); Motion Picture Investor Tax 
Credit, S.B. 165, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013). Sen. Martiny’s Senate Bill 165 
was approved June 7, 2013. 
 22. John Maginnis, Louisiana’s Revenue Commission Looks for What Is 
Broken, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Sept. 19, 2012, 8:49 AM), http://www.nola.com 
/opinions/index.ssf/2012/09/louisianas_revenue_commission.html. (“Lawmakers 
recognize that many of the existing 422 tax breaks do a lot of good, but they aren’t 
sure which ones are not, or whether a fraction of the $6.8 billion total would not be 
better spent on health care and higher education. . . . Louisiana’s generous motion 
picture tax credit, at $174 million in F[iscal] Y[ear] 11 and growing, has brought 
many productions and great industry exposure to the state, but, with some 
exceptions, has not resulted in the permanent jobs and capital investment earlier 
envisioned. But we are assured the pipeline of projects would quickly run dry 
without the state subsidy.”). 
 23. Id. See also MATHIS, supra note 3; Bailey, supra note 12. 
 24. Patrick B. Crawford, The Utility of the Efficiency/Equity Dichotomy in 
Tax Policy Analysis, 16 VA. TAX REV. 501, 502 (1997). 
 25. Eric M. Zolt, The Uneasy Case for Uniform Taxation, 16 VA. TAX REV. 
39, 42 (1996). 
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approach, this Comment suggests that although the MPITC may 
provide benefits to the State, it must be scaled back to increase the 
economic efficiency and increase equity in the treatment of 
taxpayers. 
Part I of this Comment explains how the MPITC awards credits 
and how the resale market of those credits functions. Next, Part II 
examines the efficiency of the MPITC, evaluating the tax credit 
under three models of efficiency, which indicate the credit is 
overaggressive and hence inefficient. Part III then scrutinizes the 
inequities of the MPITC. Finally, Part IV proposes the following 
three alterations to the program: (1) a statutory annual cap on the 
MPITC; (2) a methodology for awarding those credits in an auction-
like system; and (3) an explicitly limited definition of production 
expenditures. These alterations will make the MPITC both more 
efficient and more equitable by decreasing the size of the program. 
I. HOW THE MOTION PICTURE INVESTOR TAX CREDIT IS 
DISTRIBUTED AND USED 
The following discussion analyzes how Louisiana awards its tax 
credit and how that credit is then used by the production. Before 
credits are earned, the production must be state certified.26 State 
certification has four components: 
(1) The relevant department in, and the secretary of, the 
Louisiana Office of Economic Development (LED) must 
approve the production. 
(2) The production must be domiciled and headquartered in 
Louisiana. 
(3) The production must have a viable multimarket 
commercial distribution plan. 
(4) The motion picture or television project must incur at 
least $300,000 of production expenditures.27 
Once a production is state certified, the investor is allowed a tax 
credit of 30% of the base investment made by that investor.28 The 
credits are awarded within 120 days of the receipt of the “production 
audit report” certifying that “the report of production expenditures 
presents fairly, in all material aspects, the production expenditures 
                                                                                                             
 26. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009) (amended 2013). 
 27. Jayne A. Calhoun, Hooray for Hollywood! A Film-by-Film Primer on the 
Louisiana Film Industry’s Blockbuster Success Thanks to Motion Picture Tax 
Incentives, 58 LA. BAR JNL. 88, 90 (2010). 
 28. § 47:6007(B)(1). A “‘[b]ase investment’ means cash or cash equivalent 
investment made and used for production expenditures in the state for a state-
certified production.” Id. 
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expended in Louisiana pursuant to [the provisions of the 
MPITC].”29 
The MPITC applies to a wide range of expenditures. The 
legislation has defined “production expenditures” as:  
[P]reproduction, production, and postproduction expenditures 
in this state directly relating to a state-certified production, 
including without limitation the following: set construction 
and operation; wardrobes, makeup, accessories, and related 
services; costs associated with photography and sound 
synchronization, lighting, and related services and materials; 
editing and related services; rental of facilities and 
equipment; leasing of vehicles; costs of food and lodging; 
digital or tape editing, film processing, transfer of film to 
tape or digital format, sound mixing, special and visual 
effects; and payroll. This term shall not include expenditures 
for marketing and distribution, non-production related 
overhead, amounts reimbursed by the state or any other 
governmental entity, costs related to the transfer of tax 
credits, amounts that are paid to persons or entities as a 
result of their participation in profits from the exploitation of 
the production, the application fee, or state or local taxes.30 
This expansive definition contributes to a high volume of credits 
awarded under the MPITC because practically any expense can be 
argued to fit under it, particularly due to the “without limitation” 
language.31 
Once the credits are awarded, they are applied after the total 
amount of tax liability due to the State is determined. Income taxes 
are only imposed on taxable income.32 Taxable income refers to 
total taxable income minus deductions.33 Taxable income is taxed at 
a rate determined by the amount of taxable income earned.34 In 
Louisiana, this rate is 6% for those whose taxable income exceeds 
$50,000.35 Applying this rate to the taxable income determines the 
                                                                                                             
 29. Motion Picture Investor Tax Credit, S.B. 165, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 
2013). 
 30. § 47:6007(B)(9) (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. 
 32. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION 42 (15th ed. 2009). “Louisiana taxable income is computed by 
subtracting the federal income tax deductions allowed by [Louisiana Revised 
Statutes section] 47:287.85 from Louisiana net income, after adjustments.” LA. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:287.79 (2001). 
 33. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 32, at 42. 
 34. Id. 
 35. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:287.12(3) (2001). A single taxpayer earning 
more than $50,000 but not in excess of $100,000 dollars per year is taxed at 6%. 
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dollar amount of tax liability.36 Credits can then be applied to this 
amount to reduce the overall obligation of the taxpayer.37 
To illustrate how the MPITC works using a simple example, 
assume an investor expended the statutory minimum of $300,000 on 
a movie filmed in Louisiana.38 Applying the MPITC’s 30% credit, 
the investor thus receives a $90,000 tax credit for the $300,000 
investment. Next, assume the movie earns $1 million, and the 
investor is not realistically eligible for any deductions.39 The taxable 
income is $1 million, and this amount is taxed at 6%.40 If the 
investor had Louisiana income tax liability, the investor would owe 
$60,000 to the State and could offset this by the $90,000 in earned 
credits.41 Not only does the movie investor completely offset state 
tax liability, but the investor also has $30,000 in leftover credits. 
Compare this to an investor in the production of an unsubsidized 
good in Louisiana. For instance, if an investor in widget production 
earns $1 million and also expends $300,000, state income tax 
liability would be approximately $60,000, or 6% of $1 million.42 
The MPITC paid the movie investor’s state income tax liability and 
also paid the investor $30,000 in leftover credits, compared to the 
widget investor who had to pay the State the full $60,000 without 
any help from the State whatsoever. The movie investor would have 
$730,000 after-tax income, while the widget investor would have 
just $640,000.43 
                                                                                                             
 
The rate increases to 8% on Louisiana taxable income in excess of $200,000 
dollars. 
 36. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 32, at 43. 
 37. Id. at 43. 
 38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009) (amended 2013). 
 39. FREELAND ET AL., supra note 32, at 323. Likely, almost any business actor 
would be eligible for at least some deductions. This is because expenses paid or 
incurred during the taxable year are deductible and almost all business actors have 
some expenses. However, for the sake of simplicity in the calculations, deductions 
are assumed to be zero. 
 40. Id. at 46–47 (Taxable income = Gross income – Expenses – Possible 
Deductions); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:287.12 (2001). 
 41. The taxable income in this case is $1 million, taxed at 6%, meaning this 
investor has a $60,000 state income tax liability. For simplicity, this model further 
assumes a flat tax rate, meaning all income earned will be taxed at the highest rate. 
 42. The assumption of no business deductions is again unrealistic, but for the 
ease of calculation deductions are assumed to be zero. Therefore, this investor is 
taxed at 6% on the full $1 million in income, assuming a flat tax rate. This creates 
the $60,000 state income tax liability. 
 43. The movie investor made $1 million, spent $300,000, but received 
$30,000 in income tax credits, while the widget investor made $1 million, spent 
$300,000, and received no assistance to pay state income tax liability. 
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Out-of-state producers drawn to Louisiana by the MPITC rarely 
have in-state tax liability, and even if they do, the value of the 
credits often far exceeds it, leaving the producers with leftover 
credits.44 The manner in which Louisiana handles those leftover tax 
credits is one of the main sources of popularity of the program 
because production investors may transfer or sell unused credits.45 
When producers of films in Louisiana do not earn enough money in 
state to take full advantage of the tax credits, they can sell the credits 
back to the State or to entities that can use the credits themselves.46 
This process, which is referred to as “monetization,” allows the 
producers to trade in their credits for cash.47 The Louisiana 
Legislature has continued to support the MPITC’s transferable 
nature, unequivocally preserving the transferability of the credits, 
despite calls for the disallowance of transfers.48 
Though the MPITC explicitly allows those who were initially 
awarded the credits to sell them to any willing party, regardless of 
affiliation with the Louisiana film industry, the process is quite 
complex. As such, technical know-how is required to facilitate a 
transfer.49 Tax credit brokerage firms—which specialize in 
monetization, certification, and the resale process—often assist film 
productions with this complex process.50 They have relationships 
                                                                                                             
 44. RUTE PINHO, MONETIZING FILM TAX CREDITS (2011), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2011/rpt/2011-R-0462.htm. These producers are required to 
file their state income tax in their home state, not Louisiana. 
 45. Calhoun, supra note 27. 
 46. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007(C)(4) (2009) (amended 2013). 
 47. PINHO, supra note 44. 
 48. H.B. 161, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013) (proposed legislation that 
would repeal the authority for the credit to be transferred or sold); Motion Picture 
Investor Tax Credit, S.B. 165, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013) (preserved 
transferability provisions as adopted by the Louisiana Legislature). 
 49. Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:6007(C)(4) outlines the 
requirements for transferability including a $200 fee. Louisiana Revised Statutes 
section 47:6007(C)(4)(b) lays out the other requirements in pertinent part: 
Transferors and transferees shall submit to the office, and to the 
Department of Revenue in writing, a notification of any transfer or sale 
of tax credits within thirty days after the transfer or sale of such tax 
credits. The notification shall include the transferor’s tax credit balance 
prior to transfer, a copy of any tax credit certification letter(s) issued by 
the office and the secretary of the Department of Economic Development 
and, the transferor’s remaining tax credit balance after transfer, all tax 
identification numbers for both transferor and transferee, the date of 
transfer, the amount transferred, a copy of the credit certificate, price paid 
by the transferee to the transferor, in the case when the transferor is a 
state-certified production, for the tax credits, and any other information 
required by the office or the Department of Revenue. 
§ 47:6007(C)(4)(b). 
 50. Bailey, supra note 12. 
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with the major production companies and often buy huge quantities 
of those companies’ leftover credits at a discount. The brokers then 
go through accounting and business management firms to sell the 
credits to taxpayers with large in-state tax liability, who then apply 
the full value of the credits against their tax liability.51 
Returning to the example of the minimum investor with $30,000 
in leftover credits, the resale market would work as follows: The 
investor would work with a brokerage firm to apply, certify, and 
receive the credits. Then the brokerage firm would purchase the 
leftover credits for some price, say $0.80 on the dollar. The 
brokerage firm would work through the complicated transfer and 
pay the minimum investor $24,000 for his leftover credits. Next the 
brokerage firm would contact a purchaser—typically an accounting 
firm—that would resell the credits to its clients to offset its clients’ 
tax liabilities.52 Louisiana Economic Development (LED) typically 
places the resale value between $0.80 and $0.90 on the dollar.53 
Presume the minimum investor used a broker that sold the credits 
for $0.88 per credit; the broker would sell the credits to the 
purchaser for $26,400. The purchaser could then offset its client’s 
Louisiana tax liability by the full value of the credits, $30,000. In 
this instance, the minimum investor made $24,000, the brokerage 
firm made $2,400, and the purchaser of the credits pocketed $3,600 
in offset tax liability.54 
However, the role of brokers in the MPITC is waning. The State 
dramatically altered the resale market in 2009 when the Legislature 
added Louisiana Revised Statutes section 47:6007(4)(f)(ii), which 
authorizes investors to sell directly back to the State for $0.85 on the 
dollar.55 As a result, the brokers now must pay more than the state 
rate to remain competitive in the private resale market. 
If a broker pays just over the state buyback value at $0.86 on the 
dollar, the broker’s profit on the transaction with the minimum 
investor shrinks to $600.56 Considering the $200 fee imposed by the 
State and the complexity of orchestrating transfers, the broker would 
                                                                                                             
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Film FAQ, LA. ECON. DEV., http://louisianaentertainment.gov/index 
.php/film/faq/incentive. 
 54. The original producer was not only able to offset all state income tax 
liability but also sold the credits to the broker for the cash equivalent of $24,000. 
Although the purchaser of the credits paid just $26,400, the purchaser is able to 
offset his Louisiana state income tax liability by the full amount of the credits, 
$30,000. Therefore, the purchaser was able to pocket the difference, $3,600. 
 55. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009). 
 56. The broker would purchase the credits for $25,800 and sell them for 
$26,400. 
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have little incentive to engage in this transfer.57 Further, some 
production studios have become experts in the MPITC and the 
transfer requirements.58 The studios then work directly with 
accounting firms to sell the credits and bypass the broker’s 
markup.59  
While preserving the transferability of the MPITC, the 
Legislature recently took steps to better regulate the transfer process 
by establishing a central tax credit registry that specifically 
addresses the resale markets.60 The Louisiana Tax Credit Registry 
Act imposes notice requirements on both the transferor and the 
transferee and provides for increased oversight of the resale market 
by the Department of Revenue.61 Despite these changes, brokerage 
firms still engage in MPITC transfers, but their role is increasingly 
shrinking due to the State’s buyback program, the studios’ growing 
expertise, and increased State oversight.  
II. EFFICIENCIES: ELASTICITY, EXTERNALITY CONCERNS, AND 
KALDOR–HICKS 
The standard analytical model used in tax policy separates 
efficiency and equity issues to determine the efficacy of a tax.62 
Efficiency is subject to different interpretations, and there are many 
conceptions of efficiency that can yield judgments of a tax policy.63 
However, it is important to note that these models make a number of 
assumptions, including the presence of rational actors and access to 
perfect information. While this often is not the case, these concepts 
still offer a valuable framework to make judgments about which tax 
policies are most efficient. Using three of these efficiency concepts, 
elasticity, externality concerns, and Kaldor–Hicks, it is evident that 
the subsidy Louisiana is providing to film producers in the MPITC 
is overaggressive and, therefore, inefficient. 
                                                                                                             
 57. See § 47:6007(C)(4). 
 58. Celtic Media Centre, which is located in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 
advertises on its website that The Celtic Group, owner of Celtic Media Centre, 
“can help productions find Louisiana buyers for tax credits who may be willing to 
pay better than $.85 on the dollar.” Tax Incentives, CELTIC MEDIA CENTRE, 
www.celticmediacentre.com/filming_in_louisiana/tax_incentives. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Tax Credits, H.B. 377, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2013). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Crawford, supra note 24, at 502. 
 63. Zolt, supra note 25, at 63. 
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A. Elasticity of Supply and Subsidies64 
To be an efficient subsidy, the MPITC must have the power to 
draw film producers from out-of-state markets.65 From an 
economics standpoint, price elasticity of supply is one way to 
predict producers’ willingness to relocate based on the MPITC. 
Price elasticity is an economic measure used to show the 
responsiveness of film producers to price change.66 The supply of a 
perfectly inelastic good will not change even with a significant price 
change, while the supply of relatively elastic good will change more 
significantly with price variation.67 Therefore, for the MPITC to be 
efficient and actually draw new producers, the price elasticity of 
supply for film production must be relatively elastic so that the 
change in price draws producers. Unfortunately, deriving the actual 
elasticity of supply for most commodities is a difficult task.68 
However, looking at the factors affecting the elasticity of supply, it 
can be reasonably inferred that film production in Louisiana is 
relatively elastic.69 
The primary factor that influences the elasticity of supply is the 
availability of inputs, or how readily accessible the needed items for 
                                                                                                             
 64. This Section is derived from the idea of the Ramsey inverse-elasticity 
rule. See generally F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 
ECON. J. 47 (1927). This rule states that the highest rate of taxes should be placed 
on those goods with the most relatively inelastic demand or supply. Id. The idea is 
that an efficient tax system will distort consumer and producer choice by the least 
amount possible. Id. Because an inelastic demand or supply means actors do not 
respond much to price change, placing a tax on those goods should not change 
their choices. Id. However, Ramsey, the economist who first derived this theory, 
did not believe in any subsidization, and therefore it would be incorrect to use the 
inverse-elasticity rule he first posited to justify a subsidy. Id. 
 65. For the Louisiana MPITC to really work, it would seem that it would need 
to attract out-of-state producers who would not have otherwise produced in 
Louisiana. In other words, the central idea of the MPITC is to increase the amount 
of money in Louisiana’s economy rather than just increase the number of citizens 
making movies. There would seem to be little extra value in drawing Louisianans 
to film production, and this could even be harmful by creating an oversupply of 
filmmaking in Louisiana and an undersupply of other needed goods. If one 
analogizes Louisiana’s economy to a pie, the goal is to grow the overall size of the 
pie, not to divvy it up differently. That is, the goal should be to attract new 
economic actors and their money rather than to encourage Louisianans to abandon 
unsubsidized industries to work in film production. 
 66. PAUL KRUGMAN, ROBIN WELLS & KATHRYN GRADDY, ESSENTIALS OF 
ECONOMICS 149 (Charles Linsmeler et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012) (stating that price 
elasticity of supply measures the response of producers to price changes.). 
 67. Id. at 150. 
 68. Zolt, supra note 25, at 67. 
 69. See  infra text accompanying notes 70–79 (concluding that the relevant 
indicators suggest film production is relatively elastic). 
2014] COMMENT 591 
 
 
 
production are.70 California has the most readily available inputs for 
film production due to its infrastructure, trained workforce, and 
existing business base.71 However, the MPITC has helped draw 
away significant numbers of productions.72 When the MPITC makes 
film production cheap enough outside of California, producers will 
be incentivized to relocate and can do so thanks to the film 
industry’s mobile nature.73 Though the existing infrastructure in 
California and the costs of moving production decrease the film 
production industry’s elasticity, the overall mobility of the industry 
allows producers to respond to changes in price with relative ease.74 
Time is the second most important factor in determining the 
price elasticity of supply.75 Generally, the longer any producer has 
to respond to price changes, the more relatively elastic supply will 
become because a longer timeframe allows a producer to make 
necessary changes to the current production to account for the price 
change.76 For instance, a film producer needs time to research the 
MPITC and make the adjustments necessary to take advantage of it. 
Generally, film productions are short-term projects that allow 
little time for adjustments.77 Within productions, because of the 
expediency of shoots, the production location is likely fixed, making 
it difficult for the producer to respond to price changes during the 
production of one film. However, because individual productions 
wrap up fairly quickly, when a producer learns of a price change, 
there is time to respond by changing the location for the next 
                                                                                                             
 70. KRUGMAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 150. 
 71. Alex Ben Block, Report Warns That California Isn’t Doing Enough to 
Retain Movie, TV Productions, HOLLYWOOD REP. (June 14, 2012, 5:57 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/California-runaway-production-tax-
incentive-337952. Louisiana was the second most successful, behind only New 
York, in drawing away productions from California during 2009 and 2010. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Jeff Adelson, Film Tax Credits Cost State Too Much, Report Says, 
NOLA.COM (Aug. 7, 2012, 9:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf 
/2012/08/film_tax_credits_cost_state_to.html. 
 74. Zolt, supra note 25, at 63. 
 75. See KRUGMAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 150. 
 76. Id. 
 77. ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND 
RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA INDUSTRIES (2009), available at http://www 
.louisianaeconomicdevelopment.com/documents/additional-resources/ERA_Enter 
tainment_Report.pdf. The Stanley Kubrick film Eyes Wide Shut was proclaimed 
“one of the longest shoots ever bankrolled by a major studio” after it took around 
three years to finish shooting. Benjamin Svetkey, “Behind the Scenes of “Eyes 
Wide Shut”, ENT. WKLY. (July 23, 1999), http://www.ew.com/ew/article/0,,204 
71622_272431,00.html. 
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production.78 This also suggests a relatively elastic supply of film 
production. Since relevant indicators suggest that the supply of film 
production is likely elastic, assuming it is a reasonable goal to draw 
more film production to Louisiana, the MPITC may be efficient 
because it can effectuate its goal of drawing in new producers.79 
B. Efficiencies and Externalities 
Elasticity is just one method of evaluating tax policy efficiency. 
In a perfectly competitive market, market demand and market 
supply will intersect at the competitive equilibrium that is also the 
most efficient point, and if it is not at that point, the market will 
adjust to reach it.80 Therefore, if the film production market was in a 
perfectly competitive equilibrium before the intervention of the 
MPITC, the MPITC would be harmful because it would misallocate 
resources.81 However, externalities often inhibit perfectly 
competitive markets. An externality occurs when the action of one 
party makes another party worse or better off, yet the first party 
neither bears the cost nor receives the benefits of doing so.82 
Externalities can arise either from the production of goods or from 
their consumption.83 Externalities can be positive or negative.84 
Possible positive externalities caused by the film industry’s presence 
in Louisiana are the creation of thousands of new jobs and, in turn, 
new taxpayers.85 A negative externality might be high levels of 
pollution that make film production in Louisiana more costly.86 
Both positive and negative externalities play an important role in 
determining if the MPITC is efficient. Economists have generally 
                                                                                                             
 78. The producer is not locked into one location for long periods of time. 
Because of the quick film shoots, the producer can switch locations before the next 
production with ease. 
 79. Both the availability of inputs and time factor suggest a relatively elastic 
supply. 
 80. BRADLEY R. SCHILLER, ESSENTIALS OF ECONOMICS 119–22, 135 (8th ed. 
2011). 
 81. Interfering with a perfectly competitive market pushes the market to an 
equilibrium that is inefficient. This inefficiency creates social loss, or what is 
known in economic terms as “dead weight loss.” This loss occurs by prohibiting 
wealth generating transactions that would have occurred but for the government 
intervention. JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 125 
(Sarah Dorger et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2011). 
 82. Id. at 122. 
 83. For the purposes of this Comment, only externalities resulting from the 
production of goods are relevant because the MPITC is a subsidy offered only to 
film producers. 
 84. Id. at 123. 
 85. Lopez, supra note 10. 
 86. See infra note 99. 
2014] COMMENT 593 
 
 
 
accepted that where an externality is present, tax policy can be used 
as a tool for correcting inefficiencies in the competitive allocation of 
resources.87 However, to be efficient, the level of government 
interference should mirror the size of the externality it seeks to 
confront.88 Therefore, to determine if the MPITC is efficient based 
on its ability to properly confront externalities, it must be 
determined whether an externality exists and whether the externality 
is of similar size to the MPITC. 
1. Positive Production Externalities 
Positive production externalities occur when a firm’s production 
increases the well-being of others without compensation from the 
benefitted party.89 Generally, it is best to encourage this positive 
externality-generating activity to increase the benefits produced to 
other members of society.90 To do this, the government subsidizes 
the behavior that generated the positive externalities so that the 
market price reflects the social value of the good.91 The social value 
of the good is the private value to consumers plus the value of the 
positive externalities the good generates.92 Tax credits can achieve 
this social value of production by making a good less expensive to 
produce so that producers will be incentivized to produce more of 
this positive externality-creating commodity.93 
                                                                                                             
 87. Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation in the Presence of Externalities, 77 
SWEDISH J. OF ECON. 86, 86 (1975), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable 
/3439329. 
 88. Id. 
 89. GRUBER, supra note 81, at 128. 
Imagine the following scenario: There is public land beneath which 
there might be valuable oil reserves. The government allows any oil 
developer to drill in those public lands, as long as the government gets 
some royalties on any oil reserves found. Each dollar the oil developer 
spends on exploration increases the chances of finding oil reserves. 
Once found, however, the oil reserves can be tapped by other 
companies; the initial driller only has the advantage of getting there 
first. Thus, exploration for oil by one company exerts a positive 
production externality on other companies: each dollar spent on 
exploration by the first company raises the chance that other companies 
will have a chance to make money from new oil found on this land. 
Id. 
 90. Id. at 129. 
 91. Lily L. Batchelder, Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Peter R. Orszag, Efficiency 
and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23, 
44 (2006). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Clinton G. Wallace, The Case for Tradable Tax Credits, 8 N.Y.U.J.L. & 
BUS. 227, 228–30 (2011). 
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Motion picture production in Louisiana is subsidized through the 
MPITC because the credits make production less expensive for 
producers.94 This would only be efficient if in-state film production 
generated positive externalities, and the level of the subsidization 
would only be efficient if it equaled the value of the positive 
externalities being generated.95 Possible positive externalities caused 
by film production include manual labor work, catering, 
transportation, and financial services, which also create thousands of 
new jobs and, in turn, new taxpayers within Louisiana.96 Production 
staff frequent local businesses, which also causes many positive 
externalities. If these staffers are from out of state, the money they 
spend in local businesses would not have otherwise been infused 
into Louisiana’s economy. Additionally, the new group of producers 
may entice other new businesses to relocate to Louisiana.  
Although some positive externalities may be generated, for the 
MPITC to be efficient it is also essential that the level of the subsidy 
balance the externalities. The value of positive externalities is 
difficult to derive because it is impossible to differentiate between 
positive economic effects that are a result of the newly created film 
industry and those effects attributable to other factors. For instance, 
if an out-of-state worker from a film goes to a coffee shop everyday 
and spends money at that business, this is a positive externality. The 
only way to attempt an exact calculation of the positive externality 
generated by this worker, however, would be to require film workers 
to identify themselves to businesses where they spend and for 
businesses to record and report these sales separately from their 
regular business. However, considering the amount of credits 
awarded under the MPITC—$231 million from just 2011 to 2012—
the positive externalities would need to be huge for the MPITC to be 
efficient.97 
Louisiana has yet to witness this scale of positive economic side 
effects.98 From 2009 to 2012, real GDP grew in Louisiana by an 
average of 1.975%.99 Compared to the amount being spent on the 
                                                                                                             
 94. See discussion supra Part I. 
 95. See discussion infra Part II.C.1. 
 96. Lopez, supra note 10. 
 97. Maginnis, supra note 22. 
 98. The average percent change in Real GDP from 2009 to 2012 was a modest 
1.975% (3.2% in 2009; 5.8% in 2010; -2.6% in 2011; 1.5% in 2012). News Release, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, Widespread 
Economic Growth in 2012, Table 1, available at http://www.bea.gov 
/newsreleases/regional/gdp_state/2013/pdf/gsp0613.pdf. Comparatively, Louisiana’s 
Real GDP growth ranked 30th in 2012. Id. 
 99. Id. It is important to note this figure encompasses the Great Recession; 
however, comparing Real GDP growth to other states yields the conclusion that 
Real GDP growth in Louisiana during this time was conclusively weak. 
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MPITC by Louisiana, this GDP growth is unimpressive and 
indicates that whatever positive production externalities created are 
not large enough to justify the MPITC’s massive size. 
2. Negative Production Externalities 
Negative production externalities occur when a firm’s 
production reduces the well-being of others who are not 
compensated by the firm.100 Generally, the government provides 
subsidies to industries that would otherwise under-produce due to 
various market and governmental failures or externalities.101 
Subsidization through a tax credit is arguably more efficient than 
subsidization via direct governmental grants because the cost of 
determining which projects to subsidize is allocated to individuals 
receiving the credit.102 This means those recipients will choose to 
subsidize their most valued project, and the government will not 
have to waste resources figuring out which projects to subsidize.103 
However, this subsidization is only efficient where there is a 
negative production externality present and the subsidization is 
commensurate to the externality. 
Louisiana had a film industry before tax credits, which in itself 
is evidence there was never a large-scale negative externality facing 
Louisiana.104 The success of the old Louisiana film industry was 
borne mostly by New Orleans as a popular setting for storylines and 
on-location filming.105 Yet, even outside of the traditional New 
Orleans film industry in Louisiana, the State has a varied landscape 
that is attractive to film production. As one commentator noted, 
                                                                                                             
 100. GRUBER, supra note 81, at 124. The classic example of a negative 
externality is pollution. For instance, say a steel plant is located next to a river and 
dumps the sludge produced as a by-product into the river. This sludge then floats 
downstream into a traditional fishing area. The sludge kills the fish and imposes a 
cost on the fisherman who finds it increasingly more time consuming to find live 
fish. 
 101. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Equality of Opportunity and the Charitable Tax 
Subsidies, 91 B.U.L. REV. 601, 611 (2011). 
 102. Id. at 612. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Vicki Mayer & Tanya Goldman, Hollywood Handouts: Tax Credits in the 
Age of Economic Crisis, JUMP CUT, http://www.ejumpcut.org/archive/jc52.2010 
/mayerTax/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2013). Early films like Mephisto and the Maiden, 
1909, Tarzan of the Apes, 1918, and My Old Kentucky Home, 1922, attracted 
directors, actors, and other early film professionals to the State. 
 105. Filmography: 1898–1980, LA. FILM MUSEUM, http://louisianafilm 
museum.org/Louisiana_Filmography.html (listing early Louisiana films such as 
The Flame of New Orleans, 1941, Panic in the Street, 1950, A Street Car Named 
Desire, 1951, King Creole, 1958, Toys in the Attic, 1963, The Cincinnati Kid, 
1965, Easy Rider, 1969). 
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“Louisiana isn’t just the boisterous Big Easy, soggy bayous and 
graceful old plantations draped with Spanish moss. The northeast 
has pine, forests, rolling hills and small towns that can double for 
many other places.”106 Louisiana also boasts a lower cost of living 
than the national average and much lower cost of living than the two 
largest film-producing states, California and New York.107 
Additionally, Louisiana ranks far below New York and California 
on the Milken Institute’s Cost-of-Doing Business Index.108 Because 
Louisiana can be easily transformed to fit almost any setting and the 
cost of living in Louisiana is much lower than California and New 
York, it is likely that Louisiana would be an attractive location for 
film productions even without the MPITC. Given the lack of any 
evidence of a large-scale negative externality present in the 
Louisiana film industry, far less costly means like advertising or a 
less expansive tax credit program could have enticed production in 
Louisiana. 
This is not to say that Louisiana would be as attractive for film 
production without the MPITC as it is with the tax program. Rather, 
there is simply no evidence of a large-scale negative externality 
present in the pre-MPITC film industry in Louisiana such that 
substantial government intervention was necessary. However, this 
lack of evidence also does not preclude the existence of small 
externalities that would not be evident from the pre-2002 Louisiana 
film industry. Such negative externalities might be high crime rates, 
prevalence of natural disasters, or other factors that are keeping film 
producers who would otherwise choose to film in Louisiana from 
doing so.109 Although not disposing of the possibility of small 
externalities, this evidence shows that large-scale negative 
                                                                                                             
 106. Iain Blair, Pros Pick Best Places for Filmmaking, VARIETY (Oct. 23, 
2009), http://www.variety.com/article/VR1118010354?refCatId=3782. 
 107. Cost of Living, CITYRATING.COM, www.cityrating.com/cost-of-living 
(last visited Sept. 20, 2013). The consumer price index (CPI) in Louisiana is 
5.36%, lower than the national average. New York’s CPI is 15.18% higher than 
the national average, and California’s is 6.25% higher than national average. 
 108. THE MILKEN INSTITUTE, MILKEN INSTITUTE: 2007 COST-OF-DOING-
BUSINESS INDEX (2007), available at www.milkeninstitute.org/pdf/2007Costof 
DoingBusiness.pdf. New York ranked 2nd, while California is ranked 4th and 
Louisiana is ranked 26nd on the index. Id. 
 109. Louisiana has been ranked for the past 20 years as the most violent state 
in the United States according to a report from the Institute of Economics and 
Peace. Meg Handley, Louisiana Most Violent State in U.S., U.S. NEWS AND 
WORLD REP. (May 7, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2012/05 
/07/louisiana-most-violent-state-in-the-us. Louisiana has been ranked as the most 
disaster-prone state in the nation, largely because of Hurricane Katrina, which was 
the costliest disaster in U.S. history. Cameron Huddleston, Top 10 States Most at 
Risk of Disaster, KIPLINGER (June 19, 2012), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/top-
10-states-most-at-risk-of-disaster.html. 
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production externalities were not present in the Louisiana film 
industry before the MPITC was instituted. The size of a subsidy 
confronting a negative externality should mirror the size of that 
negative externality.110 The current size of the MPITC—$231 
million from 2011 to 2012—would only be appropriate from an 
efficiency perspective if large-scale negative externalities existed.111 
Yet, because there is no evidence of such a negative externality 
present, this level of government intervention is overaggressive and 
inefficient. 
C. Kaldor–Hicks Efficiency as a Cost–Benefit Analysis 
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency is yet another metric used to measure 
the efficiency of tax policies.112 Under this model, a state of affairs 
is only Kaldor–Hicks efficient if the “winners,” or those better off in 
the move to a new state of affairs, can fully compensate the “losers,” 
those whose welfare diminished.113 Before 2002, the film industry in 
Louisiana was unsubsidized.114 To estimate if the new state of 
affairs is efficient, one must consider the two parties: Louisiana 
taxpayers and the producers of the films made in Louisiana. The 
producers represent those whose welfare is increased by the move to 
the new state of affairs in which film production in Louisiana is 
generously subsidized by the MPITC, while the taxpayers represent 
those whose welfare has been diminished because other beneficial 
uses for tax dollars must be forgone to fund the MPITC. Therefore, 
if the post-MPITC state of affairs is to be Kaldor–Hicks efficient, 
the producers must be compensating the Louisiana taxpayers. 
Performing a cost–benefit analysis creates a clearer picture of if 
Kaldor–Hicks efficiency is being reached through the MPITC. 
According to a recent study, Louisiana certified $196.8 million in 
film tax credits in 2010 alone.115 During that same year, the MPITC 
                                                                                                             
 110. A tax used to correct an externality should “confront the externality with a 
price reflecting the damage (or benefit, as the case may be).” Sandmo, supra note 
87, at 86. 
 111. MATHIS, supra note 3. 
 112. Crawford, supra note 24, at 516. 
 113. Shannon Weeks McCormack, Taking the Good with the Bad: 
Recognizing the Negative Externalities Created by Charities and Their 
Implications for the Charitable Deduction, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 977, 999 (2010) 
(citing JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORALS, AND THE LAW 98 (1988)). 
 114. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009). 
 115. Millhollon, supra note 13. These economic contributions include payroll, 
purchases, and other economic activity in Louisiana. Id. This equates to roughly 
$1.00 of state tax income for every $7.29 in credits. 
598 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
generated an estimated $27 million in state tax revenue.116 That was 
a dismal return on investment at about -86.28%.117 However, 
welfare economics’s notion of individual well-being is concerned 
with more than just simple returns on investment, and it incorporates 
any other return in value, however intangible.118 Therefore, to 
address whether the producers are compensating the Louisiana 
taxpayers, more than just simple returns on investment must be 
analyzed. 
1. Benefits of the MPITC 
Positive impacts of the film industry are often broken down into 
“direct” impacts and “indirect” impacts.119 Direct impacts include: 
employment of a local workforce and external production such as 
rooms at area hotels or increased restaurant and retail revenue.120 
Indirect impacts are the non-quantifiable effects that film production 
has on the local economy such as feelings of excitement and pride 
that Louisianans experience.121 
In regard to direct impacts, the film industry brings numerous 
jobs to the State, many of which are higher paying than other jobs in 
Louisiana.122 According to a 2009 Project Report, “[p]revious 
efforts at workforce and infrastructure development are beginning to 
pay dividends, and new businesses have been founded and are 
moving to the state from elsewhere.”123 The average hourly wage 
for those employed in the motion picture industry is generally much 
higher than those employed in all other industries.124 For instance, 
writers and authors working on a motion picture earn 56% more on 
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. See also Joseph Henchman, Important Questions to Ask in Evaluating 
a Film Tax Incentive Program, TAX FOUND (Mar. 22, 2012), http://tax 
foundation.org/article/important-questions-ask-evaluating-film-tax-incentive-pro 
gram. Another independent study found the return, accounting even for movie-
induced tourism, increased business to non-film businesses and other indirect 
effects is on average between $0.13 and $0.15 on the dollar. This study supports 
an R.O.I. approximately between -85% and -87%. 
 117. Return on Investment = (Gain from Investment – Cost of Investment)/Cost 
of Investment. 
 118. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 967 (2001). 
 119. LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA 
INDUSTRIES, supra note 77. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 24. 
 122. Grand, supra note 11. Employment in film production tends to pay higher 
wages than comparable employment using the same skills. Id. 
 123. LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA 
INDUSTRIES, supra note 77, at 1. 
 124. Id. 
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average than writers and authors who work in other media.125 On 
average a worker in the media industry earns 20.33% more per hour 
than the national average for all workers.126 This is a welcome trend 
in Louisiana, as the per capita personal income in the State ranks 
31st in the United States.127  
Because of the contingent and transient character of employment 
in the motion picture industry, employment is difficult to 
measure.128 However, studies show that film industry employment 
has increased at a compound annual growth rate of 22% from 2001 
to 2007.129 Louisiana also boasts the film industry’s fifth highest 
“location quotient,” or proportion of workers in a particular industry 
in a state compared to the national employment in that industry.130 
In 2007 alone, expenditures of film producers taking advantage of 
the credit created 6,230 jobs.131 This increase in jobs coupled with 
the higher paying nature of film industry employment is certainly a 
great benefit to Louisianans. 
In addition to the jobs directly related to production, local 
sectors—such as transportation, lodging, car and truck rentals, gas 
stations, food and beverage establishments, retail, construction and 
repair, equipment rentals, personal, business, and government 
services—all benefit from production.132 Out-of-state producers and 
their employees spend money in multiple sectors that would 
otherwise not benefit Louisiana residents and businesses.133 Such a 
boon to the local economy is a further direct benefit to Louisianans 
as a result of the MPITC. 
                                                                                                             
 125. Id. at 23. 
 126. In Louisiana, the mean hourly wage for all occupations in 2012 was 
$18.86, compared to those in arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media 
occupations who earned a mean hourly wage of $21.33. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, MAY 2012 STATE OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
AND WAGE ESTIMATES LOUISIANA (2013), available at http://www.bls.gov 
/oes/current/naics4_512100.htm#00-0000. 
 127. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE: UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
PERSONAL INCOME PER CAPITA IN CURRENT DOLLARS (2007), available at 
http://www.census.gov/statab/ranks/rank29.html. 
 128. LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA 
INDUSTRIES, supra note 77, at 6. 
 129. Id. at 28. 
 130. Id. at 31 (as of 2007). 
 131. Id. at 32. 
 132. Id. at 23. A greens man or costume designer working on a film production 
can earn nearly double their regular earnings from what they would otherwise 
make in a non-production-related job. 
 133. Grand, supra note 11. 
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Indirect benefits such as the increased excitement and pride of 
local residents have garnered widespread attention in Louisiana.134 
As previously stated, Louisiana is ranked third in the country in film 
production activity, behind only California and New York.135 
Productions spurred by the credit have helped earn Louisiana the 
nickname “Hollywood South,”136 a moniker in which many 
Louisiana residents take pride.137 The MPITC has created many 
direct and indirect benefits to the State’s economy and people. 
2. Costs of the MPITC 
With benefits readily flowing into Louisiana, the MPITC has 
gained great support throughout the State.138 However, many remain 
skeptical, and state representatives have voiced concerns over the 
program’s effective job creation and ability to spur a self-sustaining 
film industry, urging that the program needs to be reevaluated.139 
Although many proponents tout job creation in the State, a large 
portion of the jobs that film productions create, especially those with 
the highest pay, are actually filled by nonresidents.140 Furthermore, 
the jobs that are created by the MPITC are very expensive for the 
State. By one estimate, each job created by the MPITC costs the 
State $60,000.141 On average, Louisiana spent 9% more to create 
each job than the average salary earned by a Louisiana film 
worker.142 This 9% is spent just on those positions that are actually 
filled with Louisianans, which is not always the case. 
                                                                                                             
 134. Even Sen. Mary Landrieu has recently expressed excitement over 
“Hollywood South,” tweeting “Louisiana’s film industry is giving #Hollywood a 
run for its money. Congrats to Hollywood South on its 2 #Oscarnoms.” (referring 
to Beasts of the Southern Wild and Django Unchained’s combined seven 
Academy Award nominations in 2013). Alicia M. Cohn, Sen. Landrieu ‘Proud’ of 
Louisiana-Filmed Oscar Nominees, THE HILL (Jan. 10, 2013, 12:17 PM), 
http://thehill.com/blogs/twitter-room/other-news/276491-sen-landrieu-proud-of-
louisiana-filmed-oscar-nominees. 
 135. Lopez, supra note 10. 
 136. Bailey, supra note 12, at 715. 
 137. Elizabeth Vowell, Hollywood South Wraps 2012, Looks Forward to 2013, 
WAFB NEWS (Dec. 31, 2012), http://wsmv.membercenter.worldnow.com/story 
/20475797/hollywood-south-wraps-2012-looks-forward-to-2013. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Millhollon, supra note 13. State Rep. “Jim Fannin, D-Jonesboro, who 
sponsored the State’s budget bill, said the film production tax credit program 
needs to be reviewed because it does not appear to be cost effective.” Id. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Adelson, supra note 73. “The state’s film tax credits cost the state about 
$60,000 for each direct job they create.” Id. 
 142. MAY 2012 STATE OCCUPATIONAL EMPLOYMENT AND WAGE ESTIMATES 
LOUISIANA, supra note 126. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, workers 
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Film production is a highly mobile industry.143 In general, most 
crewmembers are hired locally, while top personnel, like directors 
and producers, travel extensively from job to job.144 These 
nonresident top personnel enjoy the best jobs with the highest 
incomes.145 Even the local crewmember jobs are characterized by 
seasonal, short-term projects in Louisiana, not full-time, year-round 
employment as in other parts of the country.146 
Additionally, there is extreme competition between states and 
other countries, making it difficult for one location to become the 
clear winner of the “film subsidy war.”147 Louisiana and New 
Mexico currently enjoy a “first-mover advantage” because they 
were the first states to enact film incentives.148 However, a first-
mover can only capture most of a market where an industry is 
characterized by a tendency of firms to cluster together and requires 
a large initial investment.149 Because film production is such a 
mobile industry, agglomeration is unnecessary.150 Recall, film 
production has a relatively elastic supply making it receptive to 
price changes.151 Therefore, the first-mover advantage may be short-
lived and is possibly unsustainable in light of increased competition. 
While the MPITC has generated excitement, job creation, and a 
prevalent industry, the cost of this creation is enormous to Louisiana 
taxpayers.152 Not only is the basic return on investment -86.28%, but 
the jobs created also cost Louisiana far more than those jobs actually 
pay Louisiana workers.153 In 2002, the Louisiana Legislature set out 
                                                                                                             
 
across the nation in art, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations earn 
an average of $54,490. Id. Compared to the $60,000 average spent to create each 
job, the cost to create a job is approximately 9% higher than the average salary 
earned. 
 143. Adelson, supra note 73. 
 144. ROBERT TANNENWALD, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, STATE 
FILM SUBSIDIES: NOT MUCH BANG FOR TOO MANY BUCKS (2010), http://www 
.cbpp.org/files/11-17-10sfp.pdf (citations omitted). 
 145. Id. 
 146. LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL MEDIA 
INDUSTRIES, supra note 77. 
 147. TANNENWALD, supra note 144. 
 148. See LOUISIANA MOTION PICTURE, SOUND RECORDING AND DIGITAL 
MEDIA INDUSTRIES, supra note 77. 
 149. ENRICO MORETTI & DANIEL J. WILSON, FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN 
FRANCISCO, STATE INCENTIVES FOR INNOVATION, STAR SCIENTISTS AND JOBS: 
EVIDENCE FROM BIOTECH (July 2013), available at http://www.frbsf.org 
/economic-research/files/wp2013-17.pdf. 
 150. Adelson, supra note 73. 
 151. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 152. See MATHIS, supra note 3. 
 153. See supra notes 118, 143. 
602 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74 
 
 
 
to “encourage development in Louisiana of a strong capital and 
infrastructure base for motion picture production in order to achieve 
an independent, self-supporting industry.”154 Yet, the past ten years 
have indicated the industry is hardly self-supporting.155 Since 2002, 
Louisiana taxpayers’ welfare has been diminished by diverting state 
funds to support the film industry without adequate compensation 
from film producers who benefit greatly from the MPITC. Because 
there has not been adequate compensation from those whose welfare 
has increased to those whose welfare has diminished, the MPITC is 
overaggressive and not Kaldor–Hicks efficient. 
D. Consolidating Efficiency Analyses 
These three conceptions of efficiency help draw the conclusion 
that the MPITC is overaggressive, but this does not mean the MPITC 
is without merit. Film production is the type of industry that responds 
well to subsidization because of its relatively elastic supply. 
Additionally, film production produces some positive externalities, 
and the possible presence of small negative externalities may warrant 
some government intervention in the film production market. Also, 
Louisianans benefit from the new, subsidized state of affairs in 
several capacities. Nevertheless, the sheer size of the MPITC renders 
it inefficient. The analysis of the three theories of efficiency indicate 
that while subsidizing the film industry may be a good general 
strategy, the program’s over-aggressiveness renders it inefficient. As 
this Comment later argues, Louisiana may be able to retain the 
benefits of the MPITC by reducing the scope of the tax program.156 
III. “LIFE IS A BANQUET, AND MOST POOR SUCKERS ARE STARVING 
TO DEATH”:157 EQUITY CONCERNS OF THE MPITC 
In addition to devising an efficient tax scheme, tax policymakers 
must consider the fairness of a tax design.158 However, fairness of a 
tax system greatly depends on perspective,159 and though everyone 
may agree that taxation should treat taxpayers equitably, they may 
not agree on what constitutes “equitable treatment.”160 
                                                                                                             
 154. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009). 
 155. See generally BAXTER, supra note 8. 
 156. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 157. AUNTIE MAME (Warner Bros. Productions 1958). 
 158. LIAM MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP TAXES AND 
JUSTICE 149 (2002). 
 159. Zolt, supra note 25, at 43. 
 160. MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 158, at 162. 
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Tax equity is usually bifurcated into two concepts: vertical 
equity and horizontal equity.161 “Vertical equity” means the degree 
of fairness in the treatment of people at different income levels, 
while “horizontal equity” means the fairness in treatment of people 
at similar income levels.162 However, tax scholars generally believe 
that vertical equity is more analytically fundamental.163 This is 
because horizontal equity is only significant if people believe 
persons with the same levels of income should be taxed differently, 
which is largely untrue.164 Therefore, this Comment is only 
concerned with vertical equity, or the fairness of the MPITC’s 
treatment of people at different income levels. An analysis of the 
MPITC’s treatment of people at different income levels indicates 
that the MPITC unfairly benefits the wealthy and harms the average 
Louisiana taxpayer due to its massive size. 
The MPITC only allows the wealthy to displace their tax 
burdens; only wealthy film producers with large budgets can take 
advantage of the program,165 and the credits are only awarded to 
those productions that are able to demonstrate a viable multimarket 
commercial distribution plan and incur at least $300,000 of 
production expenditures.166 These requirements are easily met by 
productions backed by the six largest movie production 
companies,167 which command approximately 90% of the U.S. and 
Canadian box office.168 The cost of producing and marketing these 
large feature films averages about $100 million per film.169 
Independent filmmakers outside of the major six production studios, 
however, simply do not have the means to qualify for the credit.170 
                                                                                                             
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009). 
 166. Calhoun, supra note 27, at 90. 
 167. See generally BAXTER, supra note 8, at 11 (“The motion picture industry 
has historically been dominated by several large studios based primarily in 
Hollywood. These include Sony Pictures, 20th Century Fox, The Walt Disney Co., 
Warner Bros, Paramount Pictures, and NBC Universal.”). 
 168. Bryan Ross Bieber, Analysis of the Independent Film Industry, BRB 
PRODUCTIONS (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.bryanbieber.com/2009/09/analysis-of-
the-independent-film-industry. 
 169. BAXTER, supra note 8, at 11. 
 170. “Independent films” are those films produced outside of the major six 
Hollywood production companies. Digital film has helped increase film 
production dramatically. Bieber, supra note 168. In 2008 alone, 5,000 films were 
submitted to the Sundance Film Festival. Id. Because of the increased supply, it is 
no longer possible to approach a major studio and have them commit to 
distribution. Id. Given the high-capital investment necessities imposed to meet the 
requirements to receive the credits, including a viable multimarket commercial 
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Moreover, it is not just among film producers that the MPITC 
causes such great disparity in vertical equity. The private resale 
market also functions to only allow the wealthy to offset their tax 
liability. Because of the complicated nature of monetizing and 
transferring the credits, it is extremely risky to engage in their resale 
without professional assistance.171 Since the accounting firms that 
typically facilitate credit transfers only do so when a client has a 
significant state income tax liability,172 it would likely be very 
difficult for taxpayers willing to take the risk of purchasing credits 
without professional assistance to even access the credits for sale.173  
However, the non-wealthy might benefit from other aspects of 
the MPITC. Job creation and possible positive externalities benefit 
both the wealthy and non-wealthy.174 Yet, because the wealthy can 
offset their tax liability while the non-wealthy cannot, there is 
significant vertical inequity. This is an important concern given the 
magnitude of the program, particularly in light of Louisiana’s 
current budget crisis.175 As Jan Moller, the director of the Louisiana 
Budget Project, stated, “It’s a question of priorities and [the 
Louisiana Budget Project] think[s] it’s probably time to start 
reigning in the cost of these subsidies . . . . The question is not 
                                                                                                             
 
distribution plan, independent film producers cannot reap the benefits of the 
program. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007(C)(1)(c)(i) (2009) (amended 2013). 
Only the wealthy major Hollywood studios can easily take advantage of the 
MPITC, while modest, small, independent producers will likely find the credits 
unobtainable. 
 171. See discussion supra Part I. 
 172. Because of the amount of hours of work a completed transfer takes even 
tax professionals, most accounting firms would not consider the transfer unless 
their client had a significant income tax liability. While difficult to determine an 
exact threshold, most accounting firms would begin to consider using credits if 
state income tax liability was significant. 
 173. The key is that the larger the volume per transfer, the less credit sellers 
have to pay in transfer fees and the less work they need to put into transfers. 
Sellers of credits have little incentive to sell in small quantities and pay a fee of 
$200 per transfer when large brokers of accounting firms can buy all their credits 
with just one transfer fee. Revenue Information Bulletin No. 10-022 State of 
Louisiana Department of Revenue (2010). A $200 fee per transferee is imposed. 
 174. See discussion supra Part II.C.1. 
 175. Paul Rioux, Gov. Bobby Jindal Says Budget Crisis Calls for Spending 
Cuts, Not Tax Increases, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 19, 2011, 4:17 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/04/gov_bobby_jindal_says_budget_c
.html. Gov. Bobby Jindal referred to a $1.6 billion budget shortfall as the State’s 
next major crisis. Id. 
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whether we want the film industry here, the real question is what are 
we willing to pay to bring them here?”176  
Louisiana is making huge cuts to state expenditures that benefit 
the wealthy and non-wealthy alike, such as healthcare and 
education, while significantly increasing spending on film subsidies 
that benefit the wealthy over the non-wealthy.177 From a vertical 
equity standpoint, the current trend of the MPITC is undesirable 
because it only benefits the wealthy and not the typical Louisiana 
taxpayer.178 
However, this is not to suggest that subsidizing film productions 
is per se inequitable. Rather, the level of subsidization is inequitable 
given the current state of the Louisiana budget. If the size of the 
MPITC is scaled back and the disparity between the wealthy and 
non-wealthy lessened, then the MPITC could achieve more vertical 
equity. Additionally, if less state funds went to subsidizing films, 
more funds could be allocated to government and private sector 
programs that benefit both wealthy and non-wealthy residents. 
                                                                                                             
 176. Brittany Weiss, La. Film Tax Credits Becoming Costly, WBRZ.COM (Oct. 
18, 2012, 4:46 PM), http://www.wbrz.com/news/la-film-tax-credits-becoming-
costly/. Note that the Louisiana Budget Project is a part of the Centers on Budget 
and Policy Priorities that describes itself as a “policy organization working at the 
federal and state levels on fiscal policy and public programs that affect low- and 
moderate-income families and individuals” and is known to be somewhat liberal 
leaning. See About, OFF THE CHARTS BLOG, http://www.offthechartsblog 
.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); see also Harold Pollack, Where’s the 
Conservative Counterpart to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities?, 
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST (Apr. 14, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://theincidental 
economist.com/wordpress/wheres-the-conservative-counterpart-to-the-center-on-
budget-and-policy-priorities (noting the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities is 
“avowedly liberal”). 
 177.  
Lawmakers recognize that many of the existing 422 tax breaks do a lot 
of good, but they aren’t sure which ones are not, or whether a fraction 
of the $6.8 billion total would not be better spent on health care and 
higher education . . . . Louisiana’s generous motion picture tax credit, at 
$174 million in [Fiscal Year] 11 and growing, has brought many 
productions and great industry exposure to the state, but, with some 
exceptions, has not resulted in the permanent jobs and capital 
investment earlier envisioned. But we are assured the pipeline of 
projects would quickly run dry without the state subsidy. 
Maginnis, supra note 22. 
 178. Increasing spending on things that heavily benefit the wealthy over the 
non-wealthy, while making large cuts to that which benefits both the wealthy and 
the non-wealthy alike, is contradictory to the principles of vertical equity. 
MURPHY & NAGEL, supra note 158, at 162 (noting vertical equity is what fairness 
demands in the tax treatment of people at different levels of income). 
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IV. THE SHOW MUST GO ON: REFORMULATING THE LOUISIANA 
MOTION PICTURE INVESTOR TAX CREDIT 
This Comment has shown that while the MPITC is generally an 
effective means to incentivize film production, the overaggressive 
nature of the MPITC renders it inefficient and inequitable. In order 
to better effectuate a self-sustaining film industry, the MPITC must 
be re-envisioned to “limit the cost to taxpayers without pulling the 
rug out from under the industry.”179 By implementing two changes 
to the programs, the MPITC will become more efficient and will 
produce more vertical equity. First, this Comment advocates for a 
statutory annual cap on the MPITC and an accompanying auction-
like system for awarding available credits. Second, this Comment 
suggests an explicitly limited definition of production expenditures 
to mitigate risk associated with credits and decrease the amount of 
expenditures that qualify for the MPITC. 
A. Imposing a Statuary Annual Cap on the Amount of Credits 
Awarded 
In order to provide for a more efficient tax scheme, the 
Legislature should impose a statutory annual cap on the amount of 
credits the LED may award. By offering a tax credit of 30% of 
production expenditures, Louisiana already provides one of the most 
attractive film subsidies in the nation.180 This rate is much higher 
than those in other states, and other states are further reducing their 
rates.181 Because of this comparatively higher rate, the MPITC will 
continue to incentivize out-of-state producers to film in Louisiana, 
while the imposition of a cap would limit the cost to taxpayers. 
The statutory annual cap on the MPITC should be placed at a 
level low enough that producers must be competitive to obtain the 
credits but not so low as to discourage producers from applying for 
fear of rejection. The preference of Louisiana taxpayers to invest in 
film production in the State, especially amid cuts to healthcare and 
higher education, should also be included to address equity 
concerns.182 New Mexico recently capped its program at $50 million 
                                                                                                             
 179. David Jacobs, La. Budget Project Recommends Scaling Back Film 
Incentives, BATON ROUGE BUS. REP. (Aug. 7, 2012, 3:15 PM), http://www.225 
batonrouge.com/article/20120807/BUSINESSREPORT0112/120809841. 
 180. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009). 
 181. Joseph Henchman, More States Abandon Film Tax Incentives as 
Programs’ Ineffectiveness Becomes More Apparent, TAX FOUND. (June 2, 2012), 
http://taxfoundation.org/article/more-states-abandon-film-tax-incentives-programs 
-ineffectiveness-becomes-more-apparent. 
 182. Maginnis, supra note 22. 
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per year and employed a rolling cap process that allows productions 
to carry leftover tax credits over into the ensuing fiscal year once the 
cap is reached.183 New Mexico certified $65.9 million in tax credits 
in 2010, and the subsidy rate was 25%.184 Therefore, the $50 million 
cap was about 23% lower than the previous year’s open-ended 
level.185 This follows the national trend of states’ attitudes toward 
film tax incentive programs, as 16 states have dropped, suspended, 
or drastically scaled back their programs.186 The following graph 
illustrates the national spending trends with regard to film tax 
credits.187 
 
Louisiana should follow these national trends. There is little risk 
that film producers will begin to prefer other states’ subsidies 
because other states’ rates are not nearly as high as the MPITC’s, 
and Louisiana can save a significant amount by capping the credits. 
Additionally, since New Mexico has capped its level 23% lower 
than Louisiana’s open-ended level,188 Louisiana can reduce its 
                                                                                                             
 183. MATHIS, supra note 3. 
 184. Richard Verrier, New Mexico Senate OKs $50-million Cap on Film Tax 
Rebates, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011 
/mar/17/business/la-fi-0317-ct-new-mexico-20110317. 
 185. ($50 million cap – $64.9 million 2010 level)/ $64.9 million 2010 level. 
 186. Henchman, supra note 181. Arizona, Arkansas, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, 
Maine, New Jersey, and Washington all either suspended or dropped their 
programs. Alaska, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Michigan, Missouri, New 
Mexico, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin all scaled back. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. See supra note 186. 
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subsidy level by at least that amount without worry that a cap will 
shift preferences toward New Mexico. 
In 2011 to 2012, Louisiana paid $231 million in credits at a 30% 
rate.189 However, this was a sharp spike from previous years.190 On 
average, Louisiana has spent about $153.82 million on film tax 
credits per year in the past five years.191 Because Louisiana has a 
much larger uncapped level of credits awarded, the cap should be set 
at a similar percent decrease as the New Mexico program so as not 
to “pull the rug out from under the industry.”192 Using New 
Mexico’s 23% scale back as a benchmark, Louisiana should 
decrease its average uncapped level—$153.82 million—by 23%.193 
This would mean a statutory cap placed around $118.44 million. 
B. Auctioning off the Credits 
Decreasing the overall size of the MPITC will address the 
inefficiency created by the program’s massive size. Additionally, the 
State should adopt an auction-like system to disperse the credits. 
Because the MPITC is so lucrative for film producers, offering one 
of the largest film tax credits in the nation, the cap will introduce 
scarcity into the market for Louisiana film tax credits that will in 
turn create beneficial competition among producers.194 
The LED currently awards credits to producers after considering 
the criteria set out in the MPITC, which provides, in pertinent part, 
that when determining which productions should be awarded 
credits, the LED “shall take the following factors into consideration: 
(i) [t]he impact of the production on the immediate and long-term 
objectives of this Section [and] (ii) [t]he impact of the production on 
the employment of Louisiana residents.”195 The purpose of the 
MPITC is to “encourage development in Louisiana of a strong 
capital and infrastructure base for motion picture production in order 
                                                                                                             
 189. MATHIS, supra note 3. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. (stating that the State spent the following: $231 million in 2012, 
$179.5 million in 2011, $165.6 million in 2010, $101 million in 2009, and $92 
million in 2008). 
 192. Leslie Turk, Scrutiny Heats Up on State’s Film Incentives, ACADIANA 
BUS. (Aug. 7, 2011, 11:30 AM), http://www.theind.com/business/11129-scrutiny-
heats-up-on-states-film-incentives. 
 193. MATHIS, supra note 3. 
 194. The Legislature has recently shown a continued commitment to the 
lucrative nature of the tax credits by declining to enact a proposed amendment that 
would have scaled the MPITC back to a 15% credit. H.B. 161, 2013 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (La. 2013). 
 195. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009). 
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to achieve an independent, self-supporting industry.”196 To best 
effectuate these goals, the LED should award those credits to the 
productions that meet the two-part test laid out in the legislation. 
In the proposed auction-like system, producers will present their 
prospective films to the LED and compete for the lucrative credits. 
The LED will decide to which films to award the credits based on the 
extent to which the films will impact development of a strong capital 
and infrastructure base and the employment of Louisiana residents.197 
Producers looking to ensure that their film secures the lucrative 
credits will make sure their production is appealing to the LED, 
possibly based on plans to use or invest in Louisiana production 
studios or promises to hire more Louisiana workers on a long-term 
basis. This will sufficiently address one of the largest complaints 
about the MPITC: Production companies are not hiring Louisiana 
workers long-term.198 If only those producers who demonstrate a plan 
that effectuates the statutory goals are awarded the lucrative credits, 
producers in the auction system will compete head-to-head to show 
that their production will best benefit the State. A yearly auction 
system for the credits will help the LED determine which productions 
should be awarded the credit and will help enhance competition 
between producers, which benefits the State by addressing the 
efficiency and equity concerns. 
C. Narrowing the Definition of Production Expenditures 
The final suggested change is to tighten up the notion of production 
expenditures. Currently, the legislation defines production expenditures 
as: 
[P]reproduction, production, and postproduction expenditures 
in this state directly relating to a state-certified production, 
including without limitation the following: set construction 
and operation; wardrobes, makeup, accessories, and related 
services; costs associated with photography and sound 
synchronization, lighting, and related services and materials; 
editing and related services; rental of facilities and equipment; 
leasing of vehicles; costs of food and lodging; digital or tape 
editing, film processing, transfer of film to tape or digital 
format, sound mixing, special and visual effects; and 
payroll.199 
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 197. Id. 
 198. TANNENWALD, supra note 144. 
 199. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:6007 (2009) (emphasis added). 
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The open-ended language, particularly the inclusion of the phrase 
“without limitation,” leads to several unwarranted costs of the 
program. These costs translate to inefficiency and inequity in the 
MPITC. 
This Comment advocates for the removal of the phrase “without 
limitations” to cut costs of the MPITC by allowing fewer items to 
qualify as production expenditures, which would result in fewer 
credits awarded. This loose definition of production expenditures 
lends itself to shrewd investors taking advantage of the MPITC 
without actually contributing to the Louisiana film industry.200 The 
investigation and eventual recapture of these questionable credits is 
costly to the LED and in turn to the State. Moreover, many of these 
questionable production expenditures likely go unnoticed, imposing 
unwarranted costs. 
A more absolute definition of production expenditures, like an 
explicit listing in the absence of the “without limitation” phrase, will 
decrease the number of falsely awarded credits and hence slash the 
costs associated with their recapture. Leaving this language open-
ended only encourages clever obstructions and increased costs for 
the LED.201 Finally, if fewer items qualify as production 
expenditures, fewer credits will be awarded. Cutting these costs will 
decrease the overall size of the MPITC. This will address both the 
efficiency and equity concerns about the MPITC. 
                                                                                                             
 200. A notable controversy surrounding what actually qualifies as a production 
expense under “set construction and operation” occurred in 2009. Jeff Adelson, 
Movie Tax Credit Projects to be Checked for Abuse, NOLA.COM (July 11, 2012, 
10:30 PM), http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/07/movie_tax_credit 
_projects_to_b.html. Blaine Kern Artists and its partner, Louisiana Entertainment 
and Productions, claimed to have spent about $3.4 million producing a 
documentary called “Blaine Kern’s Mardi Gras: Building of the Greatest Free 
Show on Earth.” Kern and his associates were awarded about $1 million in credits. 
However, only about $173,000 was actually spent on expenses for making the film 
while the rest was spent on the production of the floats—Kern’s usual expenses 
incurred for the work he did for carnival krewes. Id. The LED then conducted an 
audit and found the credits were wrongfully awarded because the building of the 
floats did not count as a production expenditure. Id. The LED commenced 
recapture of the already awarded credits and is now considering imposing criminal 
liability on Kern and his associates. Id. Stephen Moret, Economic Development 
Secretary, says now there are enough controls in place to prevent this type of 
misuse, but there is still no definitive answer about what exactly falls under the 
category of “production expenditures.” Id. 
 201. The LED is a government entity. Although this change may not decrease 
the direct costs of the MPITC, it will reduce government costs indirectly. This still 
decreases the overall impact of the MPITC on Louisiana’s budget. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although on the right track, evaluation of the MPITC under an 
optimal tax theory analysis indicates that the current program is 
overaggressive, causing both inefficiency and inequity. The best 
way to make the program more efficient and more equitable is to 
decrease its overall size without eliminating the incentives for 
producers to relocate to Louisiana. Two ways to subtly decrease the 
size of the MPITC are to impose an annual statutory cap on the 
amount of credits awarded and narrow the scope of production 
expenditures that are eligible for credits. Altering the way the 
limited credits are allocated would also make the MPITC more 
beneficial to Louisiana. Using these three strategies, Louisiana can 
continue to enjoy benefits of becoming “Hollywood South” in a 
more efficient and equitable manner.202  
Amelia Hurt∗ 
  
                                                                                                             
 202. Recently, Gov. Bobby Jindal proposed eliminating the Louisiana state 
income tax. Mike Scott, Film Industry Leaders Say Jindal Tax Plan Would 
Cripple Production; Administration Disagrees, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Mar. 19, 
2013, 7:45 PM), http://www.nola.com/movies/index.ssf/2013/03/louisiana_film 
_leaders_says_ji.html. Scrapping state income tax liability would render the 
MPITC credit as is essentially valueless because the credit functions to offset state 
income tax liability. Id. However, the plan was met with strong opposition, 
particularly from those looking to protect the Louisiana film industry. Mike 
Hasten, Louisiana Senator Vows to Protect Movie Credits, SHREVEPORT TIMES 
(Mar. 19, 2013), http://www.shreveporttimes.com/article/20130319/ENT21 
/130319026/Louisiana-senator-vows-protect-movie-credits. Although the plan 
subsequently failed, many forecast that there will be a resurgent push to eliminate 
the state income tax in the future. Luke Johnson, Bobby Jindal Scraps Plan to 
Eliminate State Income Tax After Outcry, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 8, 2013, 4:33 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/08/bobby-jindal-income-tax_n_303 
9317.html. If the state income tax is eliminated, the above analysis would surely 
be altered; however, the MPITC credit would be re-envisioned to offset another 
form of state tax liability. 
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